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PUBLIC TRUST AND DISTRUST: THE THEORETICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE FOR
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
BY
ERIN RYAN*

This Comment reviews the theoretical underpinnings of the public trust, a
doctrine originating in Roman common Jaw and now constitutionalized by
many states, and explores its contentious reception by green legal theorists.
Since Professor Joseph Sax's revival of the doctrine as a vehicle for
environmental legal advocacy in the early 1970s, it has been hatled by many
·as the most powerful tool available for protecting natural resource commons
and attacked by others who argue that use of the property rights-based
doctrine will reify an ownership approach to natural resources and obstruct
the development of more stewardship-oriented legal theories of natural
resource management. Discussion focuses on the work of Professor Sax,
representing the public trust advocates, and Professor Richard Lazarus,
representing the green dissent. The Comment concludes that the green
dissent may elide the theoretical growth of the modern constitutionalized
version of the doctrine beyond its common Jaw roots.
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 478
PUBLIC TRUST AND DISTRUST.................................................................................. 481

A.

B.
C.

Sax and the New Public Trust......................................................... ~ ........ 482
The Public Trust and Notions of Property ............................................. 484
The Lazarus Dissent.................................................................................. 485

III. REVISITING THE TRUST: FIFTEEN YEARS LATER ...................................................... 490
A. The Silence of the Green Dissent............................................................... 491

B.
IV.

Evaluating the Trust Today...................................................................... 492

CoNCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 493

• Student, Harvard Law School; ].0. expected June 2001; Harvard University Graduate
National Scholar and editor of the Harvard Law Review. M.A. 1994, Wesleyan University
(Ethnomusicology); B.A. 1991 Harvard-Radcliffe College (East Asian Languages and
Civilizations). Before attending law school, the author served with the U.S. Forest Service as an
Interpretive ranger for the Mono Basin National Forest Scenic Area of the Inyo National Forest,
where she conducted environmental education programs about the Mono Lake ecosystem and
about how creative ·deployment of the public trust doctrine helped rescue It from near
destruction. The author expects to serve as a Law Clerk for Ninth Circuit Judge James R.
Browning, beginning fall 2001.

[477]

478

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
I.

[Vol. 31:477

INTRODUCTION

The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's
public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth
shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people. 1

Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania State Constitution represents
an ambitious modern vision of the ancient common law doctrine of the
public trust, a doctrine that has traditionally protected public rights of
access to navigable waterways. Traced by legal· historians to the Justinian
Code of ancient Rome, 2 the public trust (jus publicum) doctrine was
formally received in the United States via English common law, although
scholars have observed an astonishingly universal regard for communal
values in water worldwide. 3 After a dramatic debut in Supreme Court
jurisprudence preserving public ownership of Lake Michigan in Illinois
Central Railroad v. Illinois, 4 the doctrine retreated to the more prosaic
realm of state common law, 5 where it served quietly for some seventy years
until the environmental awakening of the 1960s thrust it back into the
forefront of legal inquiry.
1970 marked the dawn of the new public trust era. Professor Joseph
Sax published the seminal disquisition of the new public trust movement,
recalling past use of the doctrine to protect water resources and urging
future development of a broader public trust that would encompass a
greater range of natural resource values. 6 On April 14, in honor of the
nation's first celebration of International Earth Day, the Pennsylvania
legislature adopted section 27 of their constitution. 7 Other states paralleled
Pennsylvania's course, enshrining various forms of the public trust idea in
their constitutions. 8
I PA. CONST. art. I,§ 27.
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source
and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVrL. L. 425, 429 (1989).
3 See, e.g., id. at 431 (discussing communal water values in early to modem Asian, African,
European, Islamic, Latin American, and Native American laws: "The real headwaters of the
public trust doctrine, then, arise in rivulets from all reaches of the basin that holds the societies
of the world.").
4 146 U.S. 447, 452-55 (1892) (allowing revocation without compensation of a grant to a
railroad company of a large part of the Jakebed of Lake MiChigan, on grounds that the state
legislature never had authority to make such a conveyance of land held In trust for the public).
5 Although the public trust doctrine is generally regarded as a creature of state Jaw, its
influence is present in federal Jaw via the federal navigational servitude. See, e.g., Richard ].
Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources:
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631,636-37 (1986).
6 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in. Natural Resource Law: Effective
·
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 411 (1970).
7 See Matthew Thor Kirsch, Upholding the Public Trust in State Constitutions, 46 DUKE
L.J. 1169, 1169 (1997).
8 See id. at 1169 n.4. See genera/Jy Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and
State Constitutions: The Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 863 (1996)
(cataloging various forms of public trust-like protections in state constitutions).
2
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In the years following, environmental activists began strategizing to put
the doctrine to creative use, launching litigation designed to compel
protection of public trust resources against formidable adversaries. In 1978,
a handful of local residents and college biologists in an isolated mountain
hamlet filed a public trust lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles to cease
water diversions from the Mono Lake Basin.9 This classic David-and-Goliath
battle culminated in a 1983 victory for the Mono Lake advocates before the
California Supreme Court 10 and galvanized the new public trust
jurisprudence.''
The new public trust laid claim to the seed of the jus publicum, the
notion that certain resources are of so common a nature that they defy
private ownership in the classical liberal sense. But where the traditional
doctrine evolved to protect common rights to access for commerce
purposes (hence the criteria of navigability), the new public trust heralded
conservationist principles. The California Supreme Court construed a fairly
traditional constitutional provision requiring that the state ensure "beneficial
use" of water resources 12 to mean that "[t]he human and environmental uses
of Mono Lake-uses protected by the public trust doctrine-deserve to be
taken into account." 13 Whereas constitutional provisions modeled on the
traditional doctrine guaranteed that "[t]he title to lands under navigable
waters, within the boundaries of the state ... is held by the state, by virtue of
its sovereignty, in trust for all the people," 14 the new public trust in
Pennsylvania guaranteed that "(t]he people have a right to clean air, pure
water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic
values of the environment. "15
Environmental activists widely hailed the emergence of the new public
9 ·See jOHN HART, STORM OVER MONO: THE MONO LAKE BATTLE AND THE CAUFORNIA WATER
FUTURE 74-81 (1996) (cataloging the events leading to the filing ofthe lawsuit).
10 National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, City of
Los Angeles. Dept. of Water & Power v. National Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (holding
that the State must balance Los Angeles's urban water needs against Mono Lake's public trust
values in considering the City's application for a permit to divert lake-bound water to the Los
Angeles Aqueduct). By the time the case reached the California Supreme Court, the list of
plaintiffs had grown to include eleven additional environmental organizations and both state
and federal agencies.
II Although the lawsuit represented a victmy for the public trust doctrine and the Mono
Lake advocates, the Mono Lake controversy continued for another decade, because the
Supreme Court's decision reopened consideration of Los Angeles's diversion permits by the
State Water Resources Control Board. Faced with balancing the City's water needs against a
new set of "public trust" values, the Water Board conducted years of careful study to document
the values and likely consequences of different levels of continued water diversion. The victory
that finally yielded injunctive relief to protect the lake arrived with the Water Board's decision
constricting diversions in 1994. Decision 1631, Cal. State Water Resources Control Board (Sept.
28, 1994).
12 CAL. CONST. art. X.§ 2.
13 HART, supra note 9, at 84 (citing National Audubon Socy, 658 P.2d at 732); see also
Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971) (reading the California constitutional public trust
provision to include recreational concerns and In dicta, ecological concerns).
14 FLA. CONST. art. X. § 11.
IS PA. CONST. art. I,§ 27.
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trust as the legal tool that would finally empower them against powerful
private and government interests they believed imperiled natural resources
nationwide. 16 Scholars and practitioners have responded to Sax's call and
have advocated extending public trust protection to wildlife, 17 parks, 18
cemeteries, 19 and even works of fine art. 20 Sax's 1970 artiCle influenced the
development of numerous environmental statutes, including the National
Environmental Policy Act. 21 Judged by the pace and scope of the public trust
revival, Sax's project has met with resounding success. 22 And yet, voices of
dissent have arisen even from within the environmentalist camp,
represented most persuasively in the work of Professor Richard Lazarus.23
This Comment explores the debate among natural resource lawyers
over the true value of the public trust theory in environmental advocacy.
While activist deployment of the new public trust doctrine has mostly stirred
controversy between those who would privilege natural resource
protection 24 and those who would prioritize the protection of private
property rights, 25 an important divide has· also developed between legal
See HART, supra note 9, at 179-86.
See, e.g., Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrin~
to Include Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVrL. L. 723, 724-31 (1989}.
18 See, e.g., Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 15 (Ill. 1970} (citizens bringing
an action to stop the Chicago Building Commission from building a school and recreational
center in area parks}; Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 455-66.
19 See Washington Metro. Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land, 514 F.2d 1350, 1352 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (appellants arguing general condemnation power does not autho.rize the condemnation of
a property interest in a cemetery because of the common law rule that property already devoted
to a public use is protected from invasion by other uses except by express legislative action.).
20 See Note; Protecting the Public Interest in Art, 91 YALE L.]. 121, 122 (1981} (presenting a
theory that would extend the Public Dedication Doctrine to protect the public interest in art).
21 National Environmental Polley Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(e) (1994 & Supp. III
1997); see also Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax's
Public Trust Theory ofEnvironmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility
ofLaw Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (1991).
22 See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water
Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 574 (1989} (referring to the
Sax article phenomenon as representing "every law professor's dream: a law review that not
only revived a dormant area of the law but continues to be relied upon by courts some two
decades later"). The Sax article was ultimately adjudged one of the 40 most cited law review
articles of all time. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV.
1540, 1551-53 (1985} (cataloging the 50 law review articles of the past 40 years most frequently
cited in other law review articles).
23 See Lazarus, supra note 5; see also Delgado, supra note 21.
24 See, e.g., Terry W. Frazier, The Green Alternative to Classical Liberal Property Theory.
20 VT. L. REV. 299, 300 (1995) (arguing that classical liberal property theory falls to establish an
adequate balance between the protection of private autonomy interests and the preservation of
community interests "central to the concept of property ownership").
25 See, e.g.. James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a
Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527 (1989} (arguing that the elaboration of the public
trust doctrine in modern case law cannot be reconciled with its doctrinal origins in classical
liberal property law); James R. Rasband, Equitable Compensation for Public Trust Takings, 69
U. COLO. L. REV. 331 (1998} (arguing that states should provide compensation for public ·trust
· "takings" as a matter of public policy, even if not constitutionally required}. For a particularly
personalized duel of the proponents and opponents of the public trust on these grounds, see
16
17
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scholars who stand shoulder-to-shoulder in the environmentalist camp.
While some, like Sax, see the public trust doctrine as the environmentalist's
best hope for securing needed protection for natural resources in court,
others, like· Lazarus, fear that resort to the doctrine will. obstruct the
development of a more progressive body of natural resource law. After
reviewing the arguments, this Comment reflects on whether the empirical
progress of natural resource law has restructured the debate since the 1984
publication of Lazarus's critique of Sax's public trust manifesto. The
Comment concludes that the modern trend of constitutionaltzation may
propel the doctrine beyond the theoretical 'constraints of its common law
roots.

II.

PUBLIC TRUST AND DISTRUST

[F]ew public Interests are more obvious, indisputable and independent of
particular theory than the Interest of the public of a State to maintain the rivers
that are wholly within It substantially undiminished, except by such drafts
upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the purpose of
turning them to a more perfect use. This public Interest is omnipresent
wherever there Is a State, and grows more pressing as population grows. It is
fundamental, and we are of opinion that the private property of riparian
proprietors cannot be supposed to have deeper roots ... The private right to
appropriate Is subject not only to the rights of lower owners but to the Initial
limitation that It may not substantially diminish one of the great foundations of
public welfare and health. 26

Byzantine law declared that "(b]y natural law, these things are common
property of all: air, running water, the sea, and with it the shores of the
sea." 27 As Professor Lazarus notes, it remains unclear whether this
represented true Roman practice or mere Justinian aspiration, 28 but this
seminal promulgation of the public trust doctrine ultimately infused
' customary and common law throughout medieval Europe. 29 In the United
States, the public trust doct~ine serviced arguments in state courts against
private ownership of water resources as early as the 1820s,30 and most case
law that followed over the subsequent 150 years invoked the trust to
preserve public access to. waterways for . the purposes of fishing and

Huffman, supra. at 568-72. replying directly to a critique ofhls thesis in footnote 108 of Michael
Blumm's piece in the same symposium. supra note 22. at 597-99. See also Blumrn supra note
22. at 600 (responding directly to Professor Huffman's reply).
26 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908) (Holmes, J.. majority
opinion).
27 Lazarus, supra note 5, at 633-34 (citing THE INSTITliTES OF jUSTINIAN bk. 2, tit. 1, pts. 1-6,
at 65 (J. Thomas trans., 1975)).
28 See/d.
29 See William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based
Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive
Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REv. 385,395 (1997).
30 See Arnold v. Mundy. 6 NJ.L. 1, 71-78 (1821) (explicitly invoking the public trust doctrine
to restrict a private party's ability to own oyster beds submerged in a river).
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A.

Sax and the New Public Trust

Professor Sax's argument was revolutionary because it sought to
expand the scope of the public trust doctrine to encompass environmental
preservation, and it proved consequential in documenting a common law
basis for courts to legitimately assume a normative stance in adjudicating
natural resource questions. In the 1970 article and subsequent work, 32 Sax
focuses less on the public trust doctrine's substantive potential and more on
the procedural protections it offers defenders of natural resource values
against democratic failures of the political process: "public trust law is not
so much a substantive set of standards for dealing with the public domain as
it is a technique by which courts may mend perceived imperfections in the
legislative and administrative process." 33 Essentially, Sax argues that the
doctrine enables judicial oversight when inadequacies in legislative and
administrative processes result in wrongful discounting of natural resource
31 See, e.g., Grosse Ile Township v. Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co., 167 N.W.2d 311
(Mich.App. 1969) (enjoining a river-based dike and fill operation because, inter alia, area was
used for boating and fishing and constituted wildlife habitat protected by the public trust
doctrine): State ex rei. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio 1948) (holding that the
state, as trustee for the people with respect to waters of Lake Erie and the land under them,
may not permit a diversion of trust property to private uses different from the object for which
the trust was created): Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Duryea, 57 N.Y.S.2d 777 (N.Y. Sup. 1945)
(holding that no damages arise from state Interference with private riparian rights JNhen a
public use In the interests of commerce as well as navigation may be discernible): Southern Pac.
Co. v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 144 F. 160 (N.D. Cal. 1906) (holding that lands under the navigable
waters of San Francisco Bay below the line of low tide belong to the state and that other
waterfront lands were held by the town of Oakland but subject to a public trust and thus not
liable to levy and sale to private Interests): City of Providence v. Comstock, 65 A. 307 (R.I. 1906)
(affirming the common law doctrine that lands submerged beneath navigable waters belong to
the state In which they are located, limitable only by local legislation or custom that preserves
public trust values): Williams v. Davidson, 43 Tex. 1 (fex. 11h5) (holding that the proprietors of
adjoining banks have a right to use the land and water of the river In any way not Inconsistent
with the public easement of navigation): Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J,L. 441 (N.J. 1850) (holding that
state sovereignty precludes New Jersey proprietors from granting lands below high-water and
that a riparian owner cannot acquire title to land by filling up In front of his premises): People v.
Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287 (N.Y. 1863) (lands beneath the waters of the Hudson River are held by
government only as a public trust, and the public right of. navigation will be upheld
notwithstanding agreements by city officials to the contrary); Thompson v. People ex rei.
Taylor, 23 Wend. 537 (1840) (discussing navigational values In public trust terms). But see City
of Oakland v. Carpentier, 21 Cal. 642, 661-62 (Cal. 1863):

The City of Oakland had the title to the wharf franchise, but It Is said there was a public
trust connected with the title, and therefore she could not lease the franchise. Why not?
In all'parts of the world these franchises are In the hands of private Individuals and dealt
with for the purpose of trade and profit .... Here, then, on this subject of public trust,
this wharf franchise of the municipal corporation, the Legislature has exercised its will
and power and no one can gainsay it.
32 See, e.g., Joseph L: Sax. The Limits on Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473
(1989); Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its Historical Shackles, 14
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185 (1980).
33 Sax, supra note 6, at 509.
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values vis a vis competing economic use values, noting that "the public trust
concept is, more than anything else, a medium for democratization. "34
Interestingly, one of the more serious critiques of the new public trust
doctrine unleashed by Sax is that it is anything but democratic in
empowering publicly unaccountable judges to overturn the democratic
deliberations of legislatures35 and to frustrate very recently reasonable
expectations of private property owners without affording them
compensation. 36 Related critiques allege that the unbounded scope of the
new public trust has so far departed from its doctrinal origins that it lacks
jurisprudential legitimacy37 and may conflict with other constitutional
values. 38 Even leading environmental advocates have expressed concern that
the "blank check" evolution of the public trust doctrine not exceed the limits
of acceptable jurisprudential development, lest even its application to water
resources lose claim to legitimacy.39 In the realm of common law, the lively
discourse on these issues indicates that they have yet to be resolved. 40
However, in much modern public trust jurisprudence, these issues have
been discharged by the widespread adoption of constitutionalized public
trust provisions by the separate states. 41 So long as these provisions do not
conflict with the overarching procedural constraints of the U.S. Constitution.
they represent superstatutory declarations of the public trust, specifically
designed and democratically approved to constrain the legislature against
derogation of trust values. 42 At least in the states that have so embraced the
trust constitutionally, the antidemocratic critique has been muted, if not
mooted.

34 But Sax also argues that any of four unambiguously substantive criteria present In natural
resource confllc;ts should trigger the concerns of the public trust doctrine. Id at 562-65.
35 See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 25, at 565 (arguing that Sax's explanation of the public
trust doctrine falls constitutionally "by claiming that democratic exercise of the pollee power Is
served by permitting the courts to second-guess the legislature"); Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax
and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351. 356 (1998) (reviewing the possible
antidemocratic Implications of the doctrine because the public trust could be construed as
providing a self-executing means of overturning public decisions via the legislature).
36 See, e.g., Rasband, supra note 25, at 331-406 (arguing that states should provide for
equitable compensation to private property owners harmed by state exercise of the public trust
doctrine).
·
37 See, e.g., Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL.
W. L. REV. 239, 252-63 (1992) (criticizing the expansion of the trust's application beyond water
resources and suggesting that Its doctrinal roots may counter the presumption that the doctrine
constrains even a republican form of government).
38 See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 25, at 534 (arguing that the doctrine offends constitutional
protections against takings of property without compensation); Rasband, supra note 25, at 33132 (discussing arguments that the Illinois Central decision allowing the trust to defeat a takings
claim Is analytically Indefensible).
39 See Thompson, supra note 8, at 907 (fearing that expansion of the doctrine will further
the backlash against the use of the doctrine even In traditional water resource arenas).
40 For a particularly rigorous exposition of the constitutional Issues Implicated by the
doctrine, see generally Araiza, supra note 29.
41 See Thompson, supra note 8, at 867-68.
4Z !d. at 995; Huffman, supra note 25, at 547-49.
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The Public Trust and Notions of Property

Nevertheless, other critiques of the public trust approach follow it even,
and perhaps especially, to its constitutional infiltration. The most prominent
concern is the relationship between the doctrine and theoretical
constructions of property law. From the right hail the vindicators of private
property rights, who argue that the doctrine, in whatever form, is
incompatible with the liberal theories of property that undergird civil
society. 43 And from the left come the more unlikely green dissenters, who,
like Professor Lazarus, fear that the canonization of the public trust doctrine
as the preeminent framework of natural resource allocation analysis has
robbed civil society of the opportunity to nurture a better framework. 44
Indeed, although Sax's ideas rang revolutionary to the ears of many
environmental activists and disconcerted property rights advocates,
nevertheless the ideas remained basically faithful to traditional principles of
property law by involving the .common law concept of the "trust." The
common law's treatment of property law is grounded in classical liberal
theories of property, which give primacy to private autonomy to control
property, 45 define things (and persons) according to ownership, 46 and
elevate the right to exclude others as the most important in the bundle of
rights that constitutes "property." 47
Many environmentalists on the left reject. classical liberal property
theory because it elevates individual autonomy above all other
considerations in defining the relationship between human and non-human
components of the world and fails to. account for the ecological reality of
interconnectedness. "Green Property" 48 theorists do not dispute the value of
individual autonomy, but they advocate a theory of property that provides a
better balance between considerations of personal autonomy and competing
community interests in allocating the rights and responsibilities that should
constrain our relationship with the things that constitute property. 49 As
Professor Frazier argues,
To support the theory that autonomous control over our property Is the. best
·guarantee of liberty, happiness, and security, classical liberal property
theorists must postulate that each one of us, as a property owner, can live
more or less Independently. This Important principle-which celebrates the
independence of a landowner-amounts to denial of Interdependence between
43 See, .e.g., Nancle G. Marzulla, State Private Property Rights Initiatives as a Response to
"Environmental Takings. "46 S.C. L. REV. 613 (1995).
44 See, e.g., Frazier, supra note 24, at 300 (outlining classical liberal property theory and
suggesting alternatives).
45 Id. at 307.
46 See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 377-78 (1988) (discussing
the Hegelian "personality" theory of property ownerShip, in which a person cannot realize free
will and be accorded self-hood except In the exercise of dominion over his property).
47 See, e.g.. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherendy
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 711 (1986).
48 J. Peter Byrne first coined the term "Green Property" In Green Property, 7 CONST.
COMMENT. 239 (1990), cited in Frazier, supra note 24, at 301 n.lO.
49 See Frazier, supra note 24, at 302.
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individual landowners and the other components of the land communities in
which they live. Therein lies the flaw in classical liberal property theory. Denial
of interdependence contradicts the first law of ecology, which holds that each
thing in our biosphere, including each human being, is connected to every
other thing. 50

Green Property theorists argue that to organize our relationship with
things-including natural resources and the environment-according to a
theoretical construct that denies the essential logic of the relationship
exogenous to that framework is not only poor theory, but also a recipe for
eventual human unhappiness (or in the language of property, "disutility")
and ecological disaster.

C.

The Lazarus Dissent

In 1986, Professor Richard Lazarus published the most interesting and
influential of the green critiques of the public trust doctrine. 51 Although his
condemnation of the doctrine is unequivocal, Lazarus's effort represents one
of the more politically even-handed critiques, matching a traditional regard
for fundamental principles of liberal autonomy with the bold proposition
that society finally reject its outdated private property rights approach to
natural resource management. His alternately radical and conservative
argument thus treads a narrow theoretical ground upon which no ideologue
will join him, but none stands too far away: Measured by the mode, his thesis
bows toward the green agenda; measured by the mean, Lazarus proves the
most passionately independent of moderates.
Although this balanced analysis may lend Professor Lazarus credentials
as an unlikely moderate, little is moderate about his treatment of the public
trust. He finds fault with the theoretical inconsistency of Sax's approach to
the public trust, 52 with the trust doctrine's reliance on possibly historical and
arguably legal fictions, 53 and with its vulnerable dependence on a
proenvironment judicial bias. 54 Moreover, he argues that the need for the
public trust doctrine is receding in the wake of a new environmental
consciousness infusing the law, demonstrated in the liberalized treatment by
courts of citizen standing to bring environmental injury suits, 55 common law
nuisance's embrace of environmental and natural resource claims, 56 and the

50 Id. at 306-07.
51 See Lazarus, supra note 5.
52 See id. at 642-43 (noting that Sax declines to engage with the property rights rationale of
the public trust, resulting in his advocacy of a doctrine without a precise legal basis).
53 See id at 656-57.
54 See id at 712-15.
55 See Lazarus, supra note 5, at 658-60 (discussing the holding In Association of Data
Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970), that Article III standing requirements could
be met by injucy to a range of interests, including environmental interests). Note that Lazarus
writes prior to the Supreme Court's assault on (and subsequent redemption of) citizen standing.
See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
56 See Lazarus, supra note 5, at 660-64 (noting that "with Increasing frequency, courts have ·
abandoned rigid property-based rules in favor of balancing the competing considerations,

486

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 31:477.

expansion of the "modern police power state" 57 and of administrative Iaw. 58
Indeed, the major federal environmental statutes passed during the
"environmental decade" of the 1970s59 signified a · new governmental
mandate of environmental stewardship, and many included broad Citizen
suit provisions to involve public participation and guarantee enforcement. 60
To Lazarus, the changing shape of government represents the most
important element in the obviation of the public trust doctrine. The rapid
industrialization, war efforts, and social urbanization that occurred over the
early half of the century · transformed the limited executive branch
envisioned by the framers into the powerful post-New Deal administration, 61
marked by "the steady erosion of private property's sanctity in the face of
the sovereign police power's growth. "62 Where early sovereign power was
limited almost exclusively to its mission of protecting private property from
domestic or foreign incursion, the modern sovereign authority to tax, spend,
and regulate restructured the federal government into an institution able and
willing to affirmatively protect environmental values that might earlier have
depended on concepts of a public trust. 63 The passage of new environmental
statutes has established a complex web of permit requirements for resource
use and extraction that effectively creates a new set ·of property rights
mediated by the federal government, 64 and this regulatory state, Lazarus
argues, demonstrates increasing sensitivity to environmental concerns. 65
In short, the Lazarus dissent proposes that the evolution of government
has rendered obsolete the central premise of the public trust's doctrinal
origins, which Lazarus identifies as "a needed legal basis to ensure public
accountability for ... decisions that adversely affect the environment. "66
Lazarus argues that our society has outgrown the need for the public trust
induding both Individual equities and broad societal interests, of each party's legal position").
57 See Jd. at 665.
58 See Jd. at 679.
59 See e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(e)
(1994 & Supp. III 1997); Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-767lq (1994 & Supp. III 1997);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. III 1997);
Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445
(1994); Endangered species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994); Public Health
Service Act (PHSA), 40 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976(RCRA), 42 U.S.C; §§ 6901-6992k (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (amending Solid
Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
60 See, e.g.• 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994 & Supp. III
1997) (CWA); 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994) (ESA); 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (TSCA);
42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)
(CERCLA).
61 See Lazarus, supra note 5, at 667.
62 Id. at 668.
63 Id. at 667.
64 See Jd. at 676.
65 See Jd. at 684-85 (discussing concern for envlronmental1aws expressed by judicial and
legislative branches).
66 Id. at 679.
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"because it was based on a characterization of the relationship of the
government to the natural environment that bears little resemblance to the
role of government today." 67 . Nevertheless, the public trust doctrine
"continues to resist the ghost of narrow-minded prodevelopmentgovernment as it was, not as it is[,]" 68 and • [i] n so doing, the doctrine serves
no meaningful role in the ongoing debate em the merits; it has become a relic
of the past ready to be discarded. "69 This is especially urgent, Lazarus warns,
considering the stakes of continued reliance on the doctrine:
Continued. use of the doctrine ultimately threatens to impede environmental
protection and resource conversation goals and possibly render Pyrrhic earlier
advances. Most fundamentally, the doctrine's operation exacerbates a growing
clash in liberal ideology within natural resources law-between the need for
Individual autonomy and security, traditionally tied up In private property
rights, and the demands of longer-term collectivist goals expressed in
environmental protection and resource conservation laws. 70

Although Professor Lazarus attacks public trust-based approaches to
environmental conserVation on multiple fronts, ultimately his criti.que flows
from an antipathy for its implied property law framework similar to that of
the Green Property advocates for ecologically sterile liberal property theory.
The doctrine, he observes, His squarely rooted in property law." 71 And what
concerns him most is not the suboptimal results that use of the trust yields
in local natural resource cases, but the suboptimal legal world that today's
use of the doctrine promises for tomorrow.
The public trust, after all, remains a "trust"-in which a bundle of
specifically designated private property rights are assigned to the "public"
and delegated to the oversight of the sovereign as trustee. But Lazarus
questions the utility of this · model in application to our developing
republican, increasingly administrative, centralized, and federally dispersed
system of government.72 What precisely are the mechanisms by which the
sovereign performs its fiduciary duties? As trustee, who in the government
decides which use is most beneficial or which resource most worthy of
protection? Clearly, the trust privileges the judiciary, but Lazarus suggests
that judges lack the technical competence to oversee resource-sensitive
decisions by agency administrators who are more likely to be professional
resource managers by training. 73
Although common law principles work well to structure the behavior
between private individuals, they are poorly equipped to order the
relationship between branches of government. Even constitutionalized
public trust provisions have encountered this problem, as constitutional

/d. at 688-89.
/d. at 691 (allowing for a limited continued useful role for the trust In Its traditional
domain of access to beaches and public waterways).
67

68
69

/d.

at 692.
71 /d. at 642.
72 ld at 769.
73 /d. at 712.

70 /d.
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amendments in certain states have remained impotent when interpreted as
non-self-executing. 74 In the classical liberal world, private property rights are
inviolate, and so, as commentators have criticized, a common law public
trust increasingly divorced from its doctrinal moorings .could nonetheless
preempt even democratically supported legislative efforts to redirect
resource uses in environmentally positive exchanges.
And does it really make se~se to think of the public interest in natural
resource protection as one of ownership? Aside from the cognitive
dissonance this will stir in many committed environmental advocates, the
ownership model leaves traditionally phrased trusts vulnerable to shifting
public visions of what constitutes a beneficial use. Indeed, Sax explicitly
acl<.nowledges this limitation of the trust, although he addresses it in his
defense of the trust's frustration of riparian property owners' expectations
when the tide turned (literally and figuratively) green:
[T)he fundamental rule remains that beneficial use Is the basis, measure, and
limit of property rights In water. When uses cease to be seen as beneficial,
however long standing, they are repudiated in favor of modern conceptions of
beneficlality .... Does this mean that the wheel of history might turn again,
and that resource protection might again someday be subordinate to
development? The answer is yes. 75
To reassure his audience, Sax immediately qualifies his assertion: "In theory,
it might happen, although such a reversion is unlikely." 76 But this seems like
perilous optimism and an outright abrogation of natural resource
stewardship under competing. non-property-based views of the nature ofwell, nature.
As the Green Property theorists critique liberal conceptions of property,
so Lazarus and his fellow dissenters suggest there may be a better
framework for structuring our relationship to the natural world than through
the awkward vocabulary of property and ownership. Lazarus envisions a
natural resource legal regime in which private property rights-structured
relationships do not dominate our thinking about land and resource
management:.
[T]he historical function of the public trust doctrine· has been to provide a
public property basts for resisting the exercise of private property rights .tn
natural resource~ deemed contrary to the public interest. In recent decades,
however, ... modern trends in natural resources law increasingly have eroded
traditional concepts of private property rights in natural resources and
substituted new notions of sovereign power over these resources.
These trends ... are currently weaving a new fabric for natural resources law
that is more responsive to current social values and the physical
characteristics of the resources. By continuing to resist a legal system that is
otherwise being abandoned, the public trust doctrine obscures analysis and
renders more difficult the important process of reworking natural resource
74 Kirsch, supra note 7, at 1177.
75 Sax, supra note 32, at 478.
76 Id
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law. 77

Other authors have expressed similar frustration over the public trust's
appropriation of the environmental law discourse at a time when the
discourse seemed ready to embrace more progressive, "greener" approaches
to characterizing the special relationship between human beings and natural
resources. Professor Delgado notes that "the public trust ... model is
inherently antagonistic to the promotion of innovative environmental
thought. A trust is by nature, conservative-its purpose is to protect a
corpus and put it to some use." 78 Delgado blames the ascendancy of the new
trust for entrenching the property rights . model and preempting
consideration of alternative models arising in prominence at the time,
including Aldo Leopold's environmental ethics, Native. American thought,
and principles of ecofeminism. 79
The green dissenters challenge the notion of private property rights in .
natural resources and suggest that it has already so eroded under the stream
of government regulation and the wind of ideological progress that legal
principles by now should formally recognize the change. The undeniable
examples of resource degradation as a result of market failure-via the
aggregation of costs externalized by rational actors-prove that the property
rights model cannot sustainably direct the relationship between our
technologically bionic society and the natural environment. 80 Like Delgado,
Lazarus suggests an alternative framework for the future elaboration of
natural resource law, in which traditional notions of private rights in natural
resources are replaced by a variegated web of property rights created by
statute and administered through government-mediated entitlements.81
Unlike other green critics, Professor Lazarus punctuates his argument
by noting the importance of reestablishing a certain level of security in
private interests in natural resources, since the total erosion of private
property rights, he concedes, would threaten individualliberty.82 Essentially,
he seeks to move our relationships with natural resources away from the
absolute ownership model of private property rights and toward a more
qualified model of reasonable expectations in rights of use, in which
"reasonable expectations" are subject to communal constraints downplayed
(though not absent83) in classical liberal property theory. The public trust
doctrine, he argues in a final pragmatic gesture, fails the public even further
by reifying a property rights regime while declining to deal candidly with the
problem of private property owners' reasonable expectations in the face of
today's rapidly and relentlessly destabilizing natural resource public policy. 84
77 Lazarus, supra note 5, at 633.
78 Delgado, supra note 21. at 1214.
79 Id. at 1218.
80

Lazarus, supra note 5, at 697.

81 Id. at 698-99.
82

Id. at 702-03.

83

See Laura S. Underkuffier, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE LJ. 127, 129 (1990) (defining

the concept of property as the management of tensions between individual autonomy and
community interests).
84 Lazarus supra note 5, at 709-10.
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In resisting any compromise of its staunch but doctrinally-adrift principle,
the public trust furthers the anxieties of property owners and threatens to
fuel the "growing conflict in liberal ideology" that will only frustrate, rather
than further, the development of a unified system of workable natural
resource law. 85

III.

REVISITING THE TRUST: FIFI'EEN YEARS LATER

The public trust ... Is based on a set of modest beliefs: a belief that the public
benefits mightily from private development, but that the public interest Is In
fact greater than the sum of the private Interests; a belief that property
ownership must be profoundly respected but that property rights In water, like
rights In land, are not absolute but rather can be regulated and adjusted In
reasonable ways for the good of the citizenry as a whole; a belief that wasteful
uses of public resources are wrong and are not excused by return flows that
return to our rivers not just water but also silt, salts, agrlchemlcals, and
temperature changes: a belief that our rivers and canyons are more than
commodities, that they have a trace of the sacred: a belief that words like
'trust' ought to be taken serlously. 86
Thirty years after the Sax revival and nearly fifteen since the Lazarus
assault, the public trust doctrine remains a formidable theme of natural
resource law, if perhaps more rhetorically than legally charged. Although
calls continue to expand use of the doctrine, 87 it has not made significant
progress toward protecting natural resources unrelated to water, and even
Professor Sax eventually refocused his energies toward advocating the
importance of the doctrine specifically to water law.88
Nor, however, has it retreated to memory as Professor Lazarus had
hoped. In the last five years, claims under . the doctrine yielded
environmental victories in the supreme courts of Colorado89 and Idaho90 and
in the appellate court of Wisconsin. 91 In Colorado and Wisconsin, the
doctrine was invoked to sustain state action against the challenges of private
/d. at 710.
Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 471-72.
87 See, e.g., Eric Swenson, Public Trust Doctrine and Groundwater Rights, 53 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 363 (1999) (arguing that the doctrlne should be extended to protect public Interests In
groundwater); Cathy j. Lewis; The.Timld Approach of the Federal Courts to the Pub/Jc Trust
Doctrine: ]ustlfled Reluctance or Dei:e/Jctlon of Duty?, 19 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 51
(1998) (advocating, as Charles Wilkinson had twenty years earlier, that federal courts should
make vigorous use of the public trust doctrine in natural resource cases).
88 See Sax, supra note 32.
89 See Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d 1251.
1257 (Colo. 1995) (en bane) (holding the l'tate's trust duty requires protection of lnstream flows
to protect creek ecology against the appropriations of a ski resort for snow-making purposes).
90 See Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v. Idaho ex rei. Andrus, 899 P.2d 949, 953-55 (Idaho 1995)
(holding the public trust doctrine conferred standing to an environmental group to challenge a
timber sale on state forest lands because sedimentation from the logging would harm fish
spawning grounds and the bed of an appurtenant creek).
91 See Vander Bloemen v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Res., No. 95-1761, 1996 WL 346266
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996) rev. denled, Vander Bloemen v. Dep't of Natural Res., 555 N.W.2d 815 (Wis.
1996) (holding the public trust doctrine applies to the protection of lakeside ecology).
85
86
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property owners, and in the Idaho case, the doctrine provided standing to an
environmental group to challenge state action (in the absence of any other
statute on which they could have relied). Professor Sax's seminal article
continues to be cited in countless cases and law reviews, and periodic
symposia offer an academic forum for continued exchange on the value of
the public trust to environmental law. In a recent symposium, Professor
Carol Rose offered a thoughtful intellectual history of the new public trust,
crediting "not only ... Sax's arguments, but also ... his masterful use of the
rhetorical resources implicit in the name [with making] the 'public trust in
natural resources' ... now so well-known and so widely referenced in our
current debate on the management of natural resources." 92

A.

The Silence of the Green Dissent

That little has been heard from the green dissent over the last decade
may reflect a realization of the fears Lazarus expressed about the
appropriation of natural resources law by the public trust idea. Perhaps, as
Professor Delgado warned, the discourse was stifled and alternatives
disregarded. Inasmuch as most of the boundary-pushing ideas that emerged
in the late 1960s and early 1970s were swallowed up by the conservative tide
of the 1980s, this may be an accurate characterization. But it falls shy of
persuasive, especially since the most revisionist theoretical development in
property law.:_the Green Property movement-has occurred largely during
the 1990s.93 Indeed, in the most comprehensive theoretical exposition of the
Green Property, Professor Frazier entertains points of collaboration
between the public trust doctrine and the community interest foundations of
the Green Property project, demonstrating that ambitiously creative thinking
continues to challenge solid theoretical paradigms within natural resource
law.94
The more likely explanation for the decade of silence lies in the
surprising (to the green dissenters) turn of jurisprudential events that
followed the salad days of the early recognition of environmental values in
the law. In utter contrast to the environmentally friendly government-inprogress that Lazarus heralded in 1986, the Reagan-Bush era produced an
administrative state resistant to environmentalist concerns and an openly
hostile Supreme Court. The landmark precedent set in Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Counci/, 95 which required courts to give "strong
deference" to agency interpretations of their legislative mandates, might
seem attractively green when agencies are sympathetic to natural resource
protection. However, as foreshadowed by the. very facts in Chevron, 96 the.
Rose, supra note 35, at 362.
Frazier, supra note 24, at 302 n.l3 (cataloging the seminal scholarship of the Green
Property school).
94 See . Jd. at 354-57 (observing both the. possibilities and obstacles for a theoretical
partnership).
95 467 u.s. 837 (1984).
96 Against a challenge by the National Resources Defense Council, the Court upheld the
Environmental Protection Agency's environmentally questionable adoption of a plant-wide
92

93 See
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rule has devastated the ability of environmental plaintiffs to challenge
agency decisions that discount natural resource values in favor of property
rights and commercial interests.
Furthermore, in Lqjan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 91 the Court sharply
curtailed the liberal standing requirements that Lazarus had argued would
supplant the need for a public trust doctrine, making it even more difficult
for environmental plaintiffs to be heard. 98 Ultimately, by holding in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal CounciP9 that environmental regulations could
effect a constitutional taking requiring compensation, the Rehnquist Court
eviscerated Lazarus's 1984 proposition that the private property rights model
of interests in natural resources was giving way to a "new property" model
predicated on the sovereign power of the state to grant use rights in natural
·
resources via limited entitlements.
At least Professor Lazarus was right about the public trust's vulnerable
reliance on pro-environment judicial bias! But therein lies the fundamental
dilemma. While the changes evident in shifting federal environmental
policies reflect the vagaries of partisan politics, they also betray the
weakness in Lazarus's preferred vision of the operation of natural resource
law. Just as the public trust doctrine relies unduly on pro-environmental bias
among the judiciary, the "new property" approach to natural resource
management relies unduly on a pro-environment bias among the executive,
and to a lesser extent, the legislature. Confronted on this very point,
Professor Lazarus acknowledges the problem, but holds to his preference
that environmental matters be decided by the executive or legislative
branches over the judiciary; he favors "getting it in the regs," or sending it
through the administrative or legislative process over trusting the protection
of a natural resource to the discretion of an unaccountable judge who may
know nothing about ecological science. 100

B.

Evaluating the Trust Today

In the end, an evaluation of the public trust doctrine's value to natural
resource law may simply reduce to the given evaluator's pet federal branch.
If the judiciary is seen as the least dangerous branch (and the one most
shielded from short-term majoritarian interests), then the public trust offers
an ideal means of guaranteeing judicial oversight whenever public trust
values are threatened. But, if the expertise of the· administrative state and
the public-accountability required of agency action under the Administrative
definition of a "stationary source" of air pollution for the purposes of administering the Clean
Air Act. Id
; 97 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (dismissing a claim under the Endangered Species Act for lack of
standing because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a sufficient or redressable Injury).
.
98 But see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Serv., Inc., 528 U.S. 167
(2000) (reinvigorating citizen standing In environmental cases).
99 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that the effects of an environmental regulation amounted to
a taking that required just compensation).
100 Telephone Interview with Richard]. Lazarus, Professor of Law, Georgetown University
(May 3, 2000) [hereinafter Lazarus Interview].
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Procedure Act (APA) 101 are exalted, then channeling natural resource
decisions through an executive agency seems more likely to yield the most
informed, comprehensively analyzed results. However, as the last fifteen
years have shown, even agencies staffed with experts are vulnerable to
capture, and the APA provides little means of public oversight of informal
adjudication, which comprises the vast majority of agency action. 102 When
greens control the Department of Interior and libertarians control the Court,
surely environmentalists will prefer to safeguard eggs in the executive
basket. But what if "Wise Use" interests dominate both branches?
Today; even green dissenters concede the problem of advocating a
wholesale retreat by environmental lawyers from the public trust doctrine. 103
As Professor Lazarus notes, when a resource like the unique Mono Basin
ecosystem faces imminent destruction and the only efficacious tool in the
environmental legal arsenal is appeal to the public trust, it would seem
impossible, and possibly unethical, not to use it. 104 But this concession is
painful, because such emergency measures nevertheless serve to entrench
the hegemony of the public trust model of natural resource ·law, despite its
doctrinal and theoretical limitations. Dissenters warn that in the end, the
understanding of natural resources in private property terms that Is reified
by the public trust may render more vulnerable to degradation the very
resources impressed with the trust. 105
IV. CoNCLUSION

The visitors collect at the parking Jot, breathlessly absorbing the
magnificent escarpment of the Yosemite-Inyo Sierra before ·them,
admiring ihe defiant cones of the Mono Crater volcanoes behind thein, and
settling their gazes over the crystalline edges of the body of water between,
a vast inland sea twice the size of San Francisco-the mythical Mono Lake
of newspaper headline and bumper-sticker fame. As they gradually
descend the volcanic ash trail a few hundred yards out to shore, the ranger
explains that the parking Jot had been submerged twice their standing
height in Jakewater only a few decades ago, before the Jake's tributaries
were first diverted into the Los Angeles Aqueduct for the 350-milejourney
south to the City.
The ranger explains that the moonscape of limestone pinnacles they
are crossing formed as underwater stalagmites of sorts-rising .where
calcium-spiked underground springs permeated the carbonate-rich brine
of Mono's ancient waters, precipitating towers of "tufa" that grew until
they touched the Jake's surface from below. They Jearn of the unique
species of shrimp that populates the Jake ·by the trillions and of the

101

5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (1994 & Supp. IV

1998).
102
103
104
105

jOHN H. REESE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 261 (1995).

Lazarus Interview, supra note 100.
Id.
Lazarus, supra note 5, at 696.
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millions of migratory shorebirds that visit the Jake each year as they
traverse the Pacific flyway from the Arctic to Argentina. They taste the
kutsavi, the bacon-flavored pupae of the alkali fly that formed the dietary
staple of the Kuzedika'a Paiute for coundess generations. They Jearn how
the water diversions that began in 1942 caused the enormous Jake to Jose
forty vertical feet in as many years to unreplenished evaporationhalving the Jake's volume and doubling its salinity, threatening
ecosystemic collapse and poisoning the local air with toxic alkali
particulates windswept from the mile-wide exposed Jakebed ringing the
shrinking Jake.
And then, just a few yards from the foaming water's edge, the ranger
stops them and explains that thanks to important legal decisions between
1983 and 1994, the water level is now rising again-the salinity falling,
the birds returning, the shrimp safe from extinction, and the people
breathing clean air again-all because of an ancient article of common
Jaw, the public trust doctrine, according to which the California Supreme
Court finally decided that to allow the death of Mono Lake for the benefit of
one city would violate the State's duty to protect it as an ecological
resource belonging to all. Parents' eyes grow as wide as their children's in
sudden wonder of the power of ideas, and in awe of the devastation of
near Joss and the grace of last-minute salvatjon. And as they stand in the
midst of such unparalleled natural splendor, rejoicing in a happy ending
so rare in like stories of environmental crises, the visitors experience-for
perhaps for the first time in their Jives-genuine gratitude for the
presence of lawyers in society.
Despite the spirited debate and tumultuous development of natural
resources law, today's public trust doctrine seems well and healthfully
entrenched in the realm of law most doctrinally suitable: water law. And as
the common law continues its inexorable progress, courts extend the reach
of water-related interests over time, 106 legislative and executive branches
debate the relationship between trust values and the missions of
administrative agencies, 107 and all three branches of government continue to
explore the normative requirements of constitutionalized versions of the
public trust. 108
The Lazarus critique of the public trust doctrine as obviated by the
changing shape .of government was undone by subsequent historical events
demonstrating, perhaps ironically, that government had not finished
changing. But his theoretical critique of the doctrine as dangerously reifying
a private property-based conception of natural resource management
remains potent. The private property model leads to environmental harm via
106 See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) cert. denied
City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. National Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (the
Mono Lake case); see discussion supra note 10.
107 See Donna Sheehan Fitzgerald, Extending Public Trust Duties to Vermont's Agencies: A
Logical Interpretation of the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine, 19 VT. L. REV. 509 (1995).
108 See e.g., Kirsch, supra note 7.
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the aggregation of costs externalized by liberally autonomous actors making
otherwise "rational" decisions. Increasingly persuasive arguments are made
that natural resources left as commons do not inevitably produce Garrett
Hardin's 109 tragedy of the commons, 110 but instead that the allocation among
individual owners of illusory "ownership rights" to commons resources
produces a tragedy of market failure (or as one author has coined it, a
"tragedy of the commoners"}. 111 As Lazarus ·notes, "the problem of
externalities has become so acute that the very notion of traditional private
property rights in [natural] resources is in doubt." 112 If the public trust is
truly beholden to liberal property theory, then the rise of a natural resource
law regime predicated on the public trust risks future collapse.
Yet the public trust continues to gain adherents, win legal victories, and
inspire citizens like the Mono Lake visitors on an intellectual-emotional
plane rarely accessed by legal doctrine. One is hard-pressed to challenge the
proposition that the common law public trust doctrine developed
independent from property law, but is it possible that the force of the new
public trust doctrine, as Professor Sax has implied, 113 flows from roots
deeper than classical liberal property law?
Professor Rose suggests, in her reflections on Sax's public trust
campaign, that the primary power of the doctrine in contemporary natural
resource law has been its rhetorical facility to "challenge our ideas about
natural resource management. "114 She notes that the 'public trust' is an
"arresting phrase" that directs the attention with "intimations of
guardianship, responsibility, and community." 115 Why is it that the notion of
the public trust is so intuitively arresting that even disinterested tourists
respond immediately? (Try this with other longstanding principles of
property law, such as the Rule Against Perpetuities, to demonstrate the
special appeal of the public trust doctrine.) As Professor Wilkinson noted,
notions that water resources defy private ownership is a remarkably pancultural, pan-historical concept visible in cultural constructs constraining
resource access worldwide. 116
Commentators have attacked the validity of the public trust doctrine's
success on the grounds that it is little more than a "simple, easily
understood, and intuitively appealing approach to environmental

See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
110 See e.g., BONNIE]. McCAY, OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBUC TRUST: PROPERTY, LAW, AND
ECOLOGY IN NEW JERSEY (1998).
Ill !d. at xxlii (describing overexploltation of resources as a "tragedy of the commoners").
109

112

Lazarus, supra note 5, at 698.

113 See Sax, supra note 6, at 478-83 (rejecting property law as a doctrinal basis of the new

public trust). But see Daniel Coqulllette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some
Historic Property Cases About the Environment. 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 810-14 (1979)
(Insisting that the public trust doctrine would rest more firmly on Its historical basis In property

.

~~.

114 Rose,
liS

116

supra note 35, at 351.

!d.
Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 429-30.
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protection," 117 but perhaps it is time to ask more seriously whether this
intuitive appeal indicates that the doctrine taps into more. fundamental
principles that inform the human understanding of our relationships with
each other, nature, and law. In this age of legal realism, one hesitates to
invoke the concept of "natural law," but perhaps the intuitive appeal of the
public trust signifies its theoretical proximity to other foundational and
cross-culturai legal constructs,· such as the principle of fairness. Indeed, it
seems that the core of the public trust is the same as the core that motivates
the "new property" approach advocated by the green dissenters: the
fundamental idea that no one may exclusively control what, in the language
of common law public trust doctrine, belongs to ali-or what, in the
language of the new property theorists, we are all responsible for.
Ultimately, Professor Lazarus is right to worry that a property law
reinforcing use of the doctrine could subvert future advances in natural
resource law that emphasize stewardship, but Professor Sax may be right
that modern use of the doctrine does .not require a backwards-looking
appeal to a property law rationale. That the common law· embraced the
principles of the public trust in the available language of common law may
be no more than coincidence, demonstrated by the embrace of similar
principles by other cultural constructs predating and subsequent to
Byzantine law. In the final analysis (and especially as applied to ·
constitutionalized trusts), the fact that the public trust Is in the common law
hardly requires that it be ofthe common law.

117

Delgado, supra note 21, at 1210.

